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INTRODUCTION 
When the owners of the controversial bit-torrent website, 
The Pirate Bay, were charged with criminal offenses for 
violating copyright law,1 they asserted their right to freedom 
of expression as a constitutional right, as well as under the 
European Convention on Human Rights.2  Noting that 
copyright is protected not only by statute, but also under the 
applicable human rights law, the court sought to balance the 
human right to freedom of expression against the human 
right to property.3  The court noted that the right to property 
includes intellectual property.4  Thus, the European court 
balanced the human right to free speech against the human 
right to copyright as a form of property.  Interpreted as a 
limited statutory right, copyright should be accorded less 
weight than the human right to free speech.5  However, as 
human rights, neither the right to copyright nor the right to 
 
 1. Neij v. Sweden, App. No. 40397/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-117513. 
 2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]. 
 3. Neij, App. No. 40397/12. 
 4. Id. 
 5. In the United States, copyright law recognizes the First Amendment 
right to free speech as part of the balancing that is implicit in the law.  Harper 
& Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (“ The Second 
Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy ‘[strikes] a 
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by 
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s 
expression.’ ”).  The current argument assumes that countries respect human 
rights as inalienable rights that should not be violated.  However, this is not the 
practice in all countries.  See, e.g., Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 
26, 2009) (some of China’s censorship laws and their impact on copyright were 
at issue in this dispute).  Nor is it consistently the practice in countries that do 
recognize human rights.  
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free speech would necessarily take precedence over the other.6 
A human rights approach to intellectual property has 
been suggested as one way to achieve greater balance in what 
many commentators perceive to be a global intellectual 
property system that has led to excessive protection.7  
Intellectual property rights play an important role in society.  
The challenge, however, is to construct intellectual property 
rules that stimulate innovation in a manner that is conducive 
to social and economic welfare.8 
The “human rights framework” uses human rights norms 
to interpret and develop intellectual property laws.  There are 
two ways in which human rights norms can interact with 
intellectual property law.  First, human rights law can be 
used to limit intellectual property rights.  For instance, if one 
considers the human right to health when interpreting patent 
rights, the government obligation to protect patents could be 
limited so that it does not interfere with access to medicines.9  
This use of human rights to temper intellectual property can 
be characterized as a response to the global harmonization of 
intellectual property laws.  A second aspect of the human 
 
 6. James W. Nickel, Rethinking Indivisibility: Towards A Theory of 
Supporting Relations between Human Rights, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 984, 984–85 
(2008).  While in principle there is no hierarchy of rights, this does not always 
reflect the reality of human rights law insofar as civil and political rights are 
often given greater recognition than economic, social and cultural rights. 
 7. See Audrey R. Chapman, A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual 
Property, Scientific Progress, and Access to the Benefits of Science, Panel 
Discussion on Intellectual Property and Human Rights (Nov. 9, 1998); Laurence 
R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47 (2003); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual 
Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 
(2007); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121; 
Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual 
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 975 (2007). 
 8. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (Article 7, 
Objectives, states: ”[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”). 
 9. For example, under Articles 27 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement, all 
WTO members have an obligation to provide patent protection to inventions 
from other WTO member countries. 
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rights approach is the characterization of intellectual 
property protection as a human right.   The right to patent, 
trademark, or copyright protection is not typically considered 
a human right.  However, provisions in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights10 (UDHR) and other human 
rights instruments support the proposition that some aspects 
of what we understand to be copyright or patent protection 
are human rights.11  Initially, this may seem appealing to 
social justice advocates.  As this Article will argue, however, a 
human right to intellectual property protection is more likely 
to expand intellectual property rights than to counter the 
negative effects of excessive intellectual property protection.  
In particular, it is often assumed that corporations are 
naturally excluded from asserting human rights to their 
intellectual property.12  However, corporations have used 
human rights law as a basis for their intellectual property 
claims.13 
The characterization of these rights is important because 
framing patents and copyrights as property rights, natural 
rights, or human rights can impact their legal treatment.  
The state may place limitations on some rights more easily 
than others depending on the theoretical underpinnings of 
the right.  For instance, we may treat the rights differently 
depending on whether we conceive of them as natural 
rights—like human rights14—or as privileges.  We might 
 
 10. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 11. Id. at 71.  See also Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47 (2003).  There 
appears to be some overlap with patent and copyright protection but not with 
trademark, except to the extent that a trademark right is considered a property 
right. 
 12. Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obligations Related to ICESCR Article 
15(1)(C), in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 305, 316–317 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell 
eds., 2002). 
 13. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007). 
 14. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights as Natural Rights, 4(3) HUM. RTS. Q. 391, 
391 (1982).  Human rights are “fundamental and inalienable” rights that are 
enjoyed by all human beings by virtue of being human.  They are generally 
understood to be natural rights as understood by Locke.  Id.  While human 
rights are widely understood to be natural rights, some theorists have argued 
that human rights are not natural rights but rather that they are based on a 
social justice model.  Id. at 392. 
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inquire whether the rights at issue are fundamental15 rights 
or limited state-granted rights.  These characterizations also 
affect our understanding of the nature of the persons or 
groups who are entitled to the rights, as well as the way the 
rights are balanced. 
Since intangible rights are tremendously valuable in the 
current information economy, the treatment and 
characterization of rights is a salient question for domestic 
and international intellectual property law.  A fundamental 
constitutional right,16 like freedom of speech or the right to 
own property,17 may also be an international human right.18  
This is because the human rights framework is based on 
international principles, but these rights are typically 
embodied in domestic constitutions and enforced by national 
governments.19 
This Article contemplates the potential impact of human 
 
 15. Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1986) (“ [T]he terms ‘human rights,’ ‘freedoms,’ ‘fundamental 
human rights,’ fundamental freedoms,’ ‘rights and freedoms’ and, most 
commonly, ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ appear, in general, to be 
used interchangeably.  This practice suggests that there is no substantive or 
definable legal difference between these terms.  In these instruments at least, 
‘human rights’ are not inferior to ‘fundamental’ rights and freedoms.  They are 
the same.”). 
 16. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “fundamental 
rights” as “[t]hose rights which have their source, and are explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed, in the federal Constitution . . . and state constitutions.”). 
 17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Bill of Rights, comprised of 
Amendments I–X of the Constitution, provides for the protection of property.  
Amendment V states, in part, that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”  Id.  UDHR Article 17 states, “1) 
Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others, 2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”  UDHR, supra 
note 10, art. 17. 
 18. Mary W. S. Wong, Toward an Alternative Normative Framework for 
Copyright: From Private Property to Human Rights, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 775, 806 (2009). 
 19. Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 281, 283 (2007) (“The global human rights regime relies on national 
implementation of internationally recognized human rights.  Norm creation has 
been internationalized.  Enforcement of authoritative international human 
rights norm, however, is left almost entirely to sovereign states.”); HENRY J. 
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS 987–88 (2d ed. 2000) (“This section looks at one of the 
important phenomena of the past 50 years or so: the spread among many states 
of constitutions expressing political (and sometimes economic) liberalism, and 
often recognizing human rights.”). 
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rights principles on intellectual property law, particularly if 
corporations seek to protect their intellectual property 
interests based on human rights laws.  For instance, the 
American corporation that owns the Budweiser trademark 
made a property-based human rights claim to its trademarks 
under the European Convention on Human Rights.20  Yet, the 
question of corporate-owned intellectual property within a 
human rights framework for intellectual property remains 
relatively unexplored and unsettled.21  If the goal is to treat 
the entitlement to intellectual property rights as a human 
right, the human rights framework is likely to strengthen, 
rather than temper intellectual property rights.  However, 
where human rights objectives are used to limit intellectual 
property rights, the framework is likely to achieve its stated 
objective: bringing more balance to the intellectual property 
system. 
The argument here is not that corporations enjoy human 
rights per se or that they should be entitled to such rights.  
Rather, as the human rights framework evolves, it is 
important to anticipate that corporations will continue to 
seek to protect their intellectual property interests.  In light 
of the upward trend in intellectual property protection, 
corporations may attempt to frame intellectual property 
rights using a human rights lens, even if they do not 
explicitly make human rights claims.  This Article recognizes 
that intellectual property law can benefit from human rights 
concepts.  However, engaging with some of the theoretical 
challenges presented by a human rights framework for 
intellectual property may be useful as the framework is 
developed and tailored to meet its balancing objectives. 
Part I of the Article discusses the global trend towards 
increased intellectual property protection and the resulting 
human rights concerns.  It then goes on to explain the 
relevance of corporations to the human rights framework.  In 
Part II, the Article explains the human rights basis for 
claiming intellectual property protection.  Part III analyzes 
 
 20. Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36, ¶ 78 (Grand Chamber 2007). 
 21. LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2011). 
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the human rights framework for intellectual property and its 
potential impact on intellectual property law.  Finally, the 
Article elaborates on the relationship between corporations 
and human rights and offers some preliminary suggestions 
for limiting corporate human-rights-based intellectual 
property claims. 
I. GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TENSIONS 
A. Critiques of the Existing Framework 
Most commentators agree that there has been an 
increasing amount of tension in the international intellectual 
property system in recent years.22  Enforceable global 
minimum standards for intellectual property were 
established for the first time in 1994 when the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) was created.23  These standards include 
minimum terms of protection for copyright, patents, and 
trademarks and a requirement to provide patent protection 
for all fields of technology.24  Prior to this time, nations 
maintained a fair amount of discretion regarding their 
domestic intellectual property laws.  Increased global 
intellectual property standards were driven largely by private 
industry in the United States and Europe.25  The WTO’s 
minimum intellectual property standards came into effect in 
1995 through the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”),26 an agreement to which all 
 
 22. Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual 
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 973 (2007) (“The international intellectual 
property system is on the brink of a deepening crisis.  Government officials, civil 
society groups, and private parties are staking out opposing positions on a 
variety of issues in an increasingly wide range of venues.”). 
 23. WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 8, at 320. 
 24. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 9–21, 27–34. 
 25. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 116 (Norton & 
Company, 2007) (“[T]he corporate interests that care intensely about 
intellectual property have succeeded in getting more and more of what they 
want . . . . This was exemplified by the influence of these corporate interests in 
the adoption of the TRIPS agreement within the WTO.”). 
 26. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 65.1 (“Subject to the provisions of 
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, no Member shall be obliged to apply the provisions of 
this Agreement before the expiry of a general period of one year following the 
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members of the WTO member countries had to adhere.27  
Once TRIPS came into force, all WTO members had to meet 
the minimum standards contained therein, regardless of 
whether the standards were suitable for their domestic 
conditions.28 
The TRIPS standards were designed primarily for the 
benefit of industrialized countries with intellectual property 
intensive industries, whose interests were sometimes at odds 
with those of the developing and least developed economies.29  
While the least developed countries were given an extended 
deadline to implement their TRIPS obligations, developing 
countries had to comply with TRIPS once the five-year grace 
period ended in 2000.30  Although some countries were 
pleased with the standards, many others were dissatisfied.31  
Some nations consider the standards inadequate and have 
continued to press for increased intellectual property 
protections through other bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.32 
 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement.”). 
 27. Article II.2 of the WTO Agreement states, “ [t]he agreements and 
associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Multilateral Trade Agreements’ ) are integral parts of this 
Agreement, binding on all Members.”  WTO Agreement, supra note 23, art. II.2.  
The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8. 
 28. There was, however, a delayed period of entry for developing country 
members.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 65–66.  For a fuller discussion 
on the suitability of TRIPS for all countries, see J. Osei-Tutu, Value Divergence 
in Global Intellectual Property Law, 87 IND. L.J. 1639 (2012). 
 29. Marie Byström & Peter Einarsson, TRIPS: Consequences for Developing 
Countries Implications for Swedish Development Cooperation 48–49 (2001) 
(consultancy report to the Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (SIDA)), available at http://www.grain.org/system/old/docs/sida-trips-
2001-en.PDF. 
 30. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 65–66.  The least developed 
countries were given an extension of time until July 1, 2013, and then again 
until July 1, 2021.  See Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 
for Least-Developed Country Members: Decision of the Council for TRIPS of 29 
November 2005, IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005); Extension of the Transition Period 
Under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members: Decision of the 
Council for TRIPS of 11 June 2013, IP/C/64 (June 12, 2013). 
 31. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2000). 
 32. Peter K. Yu, Shaping Chinese Criminal Enforcement Norms Through 
the TRIPS Agreement, in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 286, 286–87 
(Christophe Geiger ed. 2012). 
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Thus, since the adoption of TRIPS, there have been a 
number of agreements described as “TRIPS plus” intellectual 
property agreements that build on the minimum standards 
that TRIPS introduced.33  Industry associations continue to 
press for strong intellectual property standards in these 
“TRIPS plus” agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership negotiations.34  Negotiations on a Trans-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) began in 2013.35  
The stated goals for the TTIP negotiations include the 
development of “rules, principles[,] and new modes of 
cooperation” relating to intellectual property.36  It is expected 
that this agreement will further strengthen intellectual 
property protections.37 
Simultaneously, there have been numerous critiques of 
these globalized intellectual property standards and the 
deleterious effects intellectual property rights can have on 
human health and access to knowledge.  Many academics and 
commentators view the current intellectual property laws as 
overprotective.38  In particular, commentators have expressed 
concern about the way patent and copyright laws affect 
developing countries that have yet to reach the level of 
 
 33. Cynthia M. Ho, An Overview of “TRIPS-Plus” Standards, in ACCESS TO 
MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS 
AND RELATED RIGHTS (C. Ho ed. 2011). 
 34. Letter from Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhMRA) to Gloria Blue, Exec. Sec’y of the Trade Policy Staff Comm., Exec. 
Office of the President 4, USTR-2009-0041 (Jan. 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/tpp. 
 35. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), http://www.ustr.gov/ttip. 
 36. Office of the United States Trade Representative, White House Fact 
Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2013/june/wh-ttip. 
 37. Alex Newman, TTIP of the iceberg – what the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership means for lawyers on both sides of the Pond, 
LEGALWEEK (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.legalweek.com/legal-
week/analysis/2327975/ttip-of-the-iceberg-what-the-transatlantic-trade-and-
investment-partnership-trade-deal-means-for-lawyers-on-both-sides-of-the-
atlantic. 
 38. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Density and Conflict in International 
Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1030 (2007); see also 
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37–41 (2003) (describing the 
expansion of intellectual property rights); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (Random House 
2001). 
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development where these laws are useful for domestic 
industry.39  Scholars and activists have critiqued the effect of 
patents on access to medicines, and the effect of copyright 
laws on access to knowledge.40  Arguably, the “access to 
medicines” movement and the “access to knowledge” 
movement formed in response to increased global intellectual 
property standards.41  For instance, there was an attempt to 
create an international agreement on access to knowledge.42  
In addition, the WTO member states issued a Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health that stated that intellectual 
property rights should not interfere with access to 
medicines.43 
The human rights framework appears to be a further 
critical response to these strengthened intellectual property 
rights, and one that is pertinent to the access to medicines 
movement, the access to knowledge movement,44 and the 
proposal for a new traditional knowledge right.45  The human 
rights framework is a potentially powerful model for 
reforming global intellectual property law.  It could help to 
counter excessive intellectual property rights, but it could 
 
 39. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006). 
 40. See Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising 
Failure and the Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 
171 (2000) (noting the patent related health concerns of developing country 
members); Helfer, supra note 22, at 984–86; Charles R. McManis, Intellectual 
Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection: Thinking 
Globally, Acting Locally, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 547, 548–51 (2003) 
(discussing the North-South division and the negative reaction of farmers in 
India to the TRIPS Agreement). 
 41. See, e.g., Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, available at 
http://www.futureofwipo.org/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf.  In this document, a 
number of members of civil society expressed their concern about the future of 
the WIPO (“ WIPO must also express a more balanced view of the relative 
benefits of harmonization and diversity, and seek to impose global conformity 
only when it truly benefits all of humanity.  A ‘one size fits all’  approach that 
embraces the highest levels of intellectual property protection for everyone 
leads to unjust and burdensome outcomes for countries that are struggling to 
meet the most basic needs of their citizens.”). 
 42. Treaty on Access to Knowledge (Draft), May 9, 2005, available at 
http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf. 
 43. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 44. Treaty on Access to Knowledge (Draft), supra note 42. 
 45. See World Intellectual Property Organization [hereinafter WIPO], 
Traditional Knowledge, http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/. 
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also enhance protections for intellectual property producers. 
The assertion that a human rights framework for 
intellectual property does not extend to corporations renders 
the human rights approach more consistent with the objective 
of tempering the excesses of intellectual property because it 
largely excludes those who sought higher intellectual 
property standards at the WTO.  However, developments in 
intellectual property law over the past several years indicate 
that businesses—including corporations that own intellectual 
property—will seek to protect their rights to the maximum 
extent possible.46  If the purpose of incorporating human 
rights principles into intellectual property law is to create a 
more balanced system, the potential for large corporations to 
utilize the framework is pertinent to the discussion.  Yet, the 
relationship between corporations and the human rights 
framework for intellectual property has received minimal 
attention in the literature. 
B. Corporate Human Rights Claims to Intellectual 
Property 
There are three reasons for giving corporations further 
consideration.  First, the proposed human rights framework 
must be considered in context.  The relevant context is that 
globalized intellectual property standards were driven largely 
by the interests of major companies.47  Furthermore, the 
purpose of the merger between trade and intellectual 
property was to ensure that the intellectual property held by 
American and European companies would be adequately 
protected overseas.48  The trend described as the “ratcheting 
up” of intellectual property rights is largely about protecting 
business interests.  Intellectual property producing 
companies—whether corporations or other business entities—
 
 46. See Mike Palmedo, Notes on Third Hearing of U.S. International Trade 
Commission Investigation of Trade, Investment, and Industrial Policies in India, 
INFOJUSTICE (Feb. 17, 2004), available at http://infojustice.org/archives/32228. 
 47. Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering 
the TRIPS Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819, 858–59 (2003); SUSAN K. 
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 97–99 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003); Chapman, supra note 
12 at 308. 
 48. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property 
Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 274 (1991). 
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will continue to press for higher intellectual property 
standards.49  It is within this context that one must evaluate 
the benefit of a human rights approach to intellectual 
property law and policy. 
Second, states extend human rights protections50 to legal 
persons when they believe there is some basis for doing so.51  
Thus, both legal and natural persons may enjoy the right to 
property and the right to free speech, for example, but not a 
right to be free from torture.52  Since a legal person cannot be 
tortured, there is no rational basis for extending such rights 
to corporations.  However, corporations, like natural persons, 
own property and can participate in speech, which is why 
nations may choose to extend speech, property, or other 
human rights to corporations. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, framing 
intellectual property rights through a human rights lens can 
alter the way we perceive intellectual property rights for both 
legal and natural persons.  Moreover, the human rights 
framing, which is based on a natural rights approach rather 
than the current utilitarian approach to intellectual property, 
could strengthen, rather than weaken, intellectual property 
rights.  Contemplating the human rights framework from an 
intellectual property perspective, this Article posits that the 
same business interests that continue to pursue increased 
global intellectual property standards are likely to attempt to 
frame human rights claims to their intellectual property. 
One may not be inclined to think of large business 
corporations enjoying human rights protection to their 
copyrights and patents.  Yet, there have been instances of 
corporations relying on human rights law to protect their 
 
 49. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) [hereinafter TPP], http://www.ustr.gov/tpp; Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) [hereinafter ACTA], http://www.ustr.gov/acta. 
 50. Such rights have been more accurately described as rights “akin to 
human rights” or “human rights-like” since the rights do not pertain to human 
beings.  However, for the purposes of this article, I will use the term “human 
rights” even when referring to legal persons rather than natural persons. 
 51. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21. 
 52. See Soc’y for Propagation of Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of Pawlet, 
29 U.S. 480 (1830); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
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intellectual property rights in Europe.53  Despite the 
ambiguity in the literature about the relationship between 
corporations and the human rights framework, there is legal 
precedent for recognizing human rights-based intellectual 
property claims by legal persons.54  While these cases are of 
limited application as legal precedents, they illustrate the 
potential for industry to co-opt a human rights framework in 
order to protect corporate-owned intellectual property.55 
In Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal,56 (“Budweiser”) the 
European Court of Human Rights concluded that corporate-
owned intellectual property rights are property interests 
subject to protection under the human rights framework in 
Europe.57  Although this case has been criticized by some 
human rights advocates and interpreted by others as being of 
limited application,58 other commentators view the analysis 
as consistent with the objectives of human rights law.59 
In a dispute over the registration of the trademark 
“Budweiser,” an American corporation, Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc.,60 unsuccessfully sought to protect its trademark rights 
under the relevant intellectual property laws.61  After finally 
 
 53. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007). 
 54. Id. at ¶ 78. 
 55. Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and 
Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 728–30 (2007); U.N. Econ. & Soc. 
Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights [CESCR], General 
Comment No. 17 (2005): The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of 
the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or 
Artistic Production of Which He or She Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), 
of the Covenant) U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006), at 2–3 [hereinafter 
General Comment No. 17]. 
 56. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Wong, supra note 18, at 811. 
 59. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 62. 
 60. Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36, ¶ 12 (Grand Chamber 2007) (“The applicant is an American public 
company whose registered office is in Saint Louis, Missouri [United States of 
America].  It produces and sells beer under the brand name “Budweiser” in a 
number of countries around the world.”). 
 61. Id. ¶ 21 (“In a judgment of 18 July 1998, the Lisbon Court of First 
Instance dismissed the appeal.  It found that the only intellectual property 
eligible for protection under Portuguese law and the Bilateral Agreement was 
the “Českobudějovický Budvar” appellation of origin, not the “Budweiser” trade 
mark.”).  The case, which involved the registration of a trademark in Portugal, 
was subsequently appealed to the Lisbon Court of Appeal and the Lisbon 
Supreme Court.  Id. ¶¶ 22–26. 
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losing before the Portuguese Supreme Court,62 the company 
took its case to the European Court of Human Rights to claim 
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of its possessions 
contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.  The company argued that the Supreme 
Court’s decision amounted to an expropriation,63 contrary to 
European human rights law.64 
When Annheuser sought to register its “Budweiser” 
trademark in Europe, its registration was opposed by 
Budwar, who had registered “Budweiser” as an appellation of 
origin.65  The name “Budweiser” comes from the name 
“Budweis”— a German name for the Czech town from which 
the beer originates.66  The Czech company, Budejovicky 
Budwar, asserted that a handful of brewers were given the 
authority to use the appellation “Budweiser” as early as 1295, 
and that Budwar had been selling its “Budweiser” beer since 
1895.67  The term referred not only to the German name of 
the town, but also to the special technique used to produce 
beers that carried the name “Budweiser.”68  Annheuser 
litigated unsuccessfully in the Portuguese courts.69  
 
 62. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36. 
 63. The U.S. equivalent of an “expropriation” is a “taking.” 
 64. Anheuser-Busch, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36, ¶ 46 (“ Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
reads as follows: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions except 
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by 
the general principles of international law.  The preceding provisions shall not, 
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest 
or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ ”). 
 65. Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36, ¶ 16 (Grand Chamber 2007).  The appellation of origin was registered 
pursuant to Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and 
their International Registration, October 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205, as am.  An 
appellation of origin protects a name that is the name of a country or a 
geographic region or locality and where there is some quality or characteristic of 
the product that is attributable to its geographic origin. 
 66. Id. ¶ 14. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  In 1911 and 1939, Annheuser and Budejovicky Budwar concluded 
agreements regarding the sale and distribution of “Budweiser” beer in the 
United States, but the agreement did not cover the sale of the beer in Europe.  
Id. ¶ 15. 
 69. Annheuser successfully had the Budwar appellation of origin cancelled 
on the basis that it was not an indication of source.  Following the cancellation 
of Budwar’s appellation of origin, Annheuser’s Budweiser’s trademark was 
registered in 1995.  The Lisbon Court of Appeal ordered the registration 
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Annheuser then lodged a complaint against Portugal under 
the ECHR for a violation of its right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of its possessions because it had been deprived of 
the right to use its trademark.70 
Ultimately, Anheuser was not successful in its claim.71  
For the majority, the question turned on whether Anheuser 
had a right of priority with respect to the “Budweiser” mark 
at the relevant time.72  Most importantly, from the 
intellectual property perspective, the court explicitly 
recognized intellectual property rights as being protected 
under the property right provision of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.73 
Some commentators have suggested that this case should 
not be viewed as support for the proposition that there is a 
property-based human right to intellectual property.74  This is 
because a decision of the European Court of Human Rights is 
limited to its jurisdiction.  Furthermore, the language of the 
ECHR is not identical to the language of the Article 17 of the 
 
overturned, and the Portuguese Supreme Court dismissed Annheuser’s appeal.  
Id. ¶¶ 18, 19, 22–24. 
 70. Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36, ¶¶ 1–3 (Grand Chamber 2007). 
 71. This included the Paris Convention and TRIPS.  The human rights court 
took into consideration a Bilateral Agreement between the Czech Republic and 
Portugal on appellations of origin and indications of source as well as 
international agreements on intellectual property, Community law, and 
domestic law.  Id. ¶¶ 25–30, 34–35. 
 72. Id. ¶ 84.  The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
chose not to interfere with the conclusions of the national court: “[t]hese are 
questions whose rightful place was before the domestic courts.  The Supreme 
Court decided in its judgment of 23 January 2001 to reject the applicant 
company’s argument based on an alleged violation of the priority rule.  In the 
absence of any arbitrariness or manifest unreasonableness, the Court cannot 
call into question the findings of the Supreme Court on this point.”  Id. at ¶ 85. 
 73. Id. ¶ 72 (After reviewing cases where property rights had been asserted 
with respect to patents and copyrights, the court concluded, “[i]n the light of the 
above-mentioned decisions, the Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber’s 
conclusion that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable to intellectual property 
as such.”); see also Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Steiner and Hajiyev ¶¶ 
1–2 (“We agreed with the majority that there has been no violation of Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1, but on other grounds.  In our view, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
does apply, in general, to intellectual property.  This was accepted by both the 
parties but there has never been any clear statement of this principle by the 
Court in the past.  We therefore agree that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is 
applicable to intellectual property in general and to a duly registered trade 
mark.”). 
 74. Wong, supra note 18, at 811. 
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UDHR and Article 15 (1)(c) of the ICESCR, both of which 
provide for the protection of moral and material interests.75  
It has been suggested that because there is no provision for 
the protection of moral and material interests under the 
ECHR, that there was no alternative to protect the 
trademark interest except as a property right.76 
However, there is no reason to assume that one could not 
have rights to the material interests in one’s intellectual 
creations or that those material interests could not also be 
considered property.  The two rights do not appear to be 
mutually exclusive, and indeed, the right to material 
interests coincides with the property interest.77  Moreover, 
there are instances outside of the context of the European 
human rights system where property interests have been 
asserted in intangible rights.  American courts have, in 
various instances, treated intellectual property interests as 
property rights,78 and recognized trademarks, trade secrets, 
and other intangible rights as property under U.S. law.79  
There is a wealth of U.S. jurisprudence where the courts refer 
to some forms of intellectual property as property and have 
treated trademarks and trade secrets as constitutionally 
protected property.80 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, at 3 (“Moreover, the realization 
of article 15, paragraph1 (c), is dependent on the enjoyment of other human 
rights guaranteed in the International Bill of Human Rights and other 
international and regional instruments, such as the right to own property alone 
as well as in association with others.”); Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., Intellectual 
Property: A Universal Human Right?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 175 (1999) 
(“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the 
author.  The basis for such a claim without doubt lies in the Western conception 
of property rights.  What this implies is that, similar to the ownership of 
property, people also have an exclusive right to their ideas, creations, and 
inventions.”). 
 78. James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 290 
(2013) (stating that it may not make a difference to the human rights discussion 
whether or not the property is constitutionally protected). 
 79. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2004) (discussing various cases where the courts 
have referred to intellectual property rights as “property”). 
 80. See id. at 10–11 (2004) (discussing various cases where the courts have 
referred to intellectual property rights as “property”); see generally Adam 
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of 
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007); Adam Mossoff, Is 
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As the next section will explain, it is possible to support 
the assertion that there is a human right to intellectual 
property protection either as property or as the material or 
moral interest of the author. 
 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION? 
There is a legal basis for the view that  intellectual 
property protection could be considered a human right.81  
While this claim can be supported, the argument can also be 
made that the human rights in question are distinct from 
copyright and patent protection. Other scholars have already 
engaged in thoughtful analysis of the right to intellectual 
property as a human right.82  Thus, this Article will offer 
limited analysis of this issue.  It is clear that human rights 
instruments offer some basis for claiming a human right to 
intellectual property or something similar to an intellectual 
property right.  
A human right to intellectual property protection may 
stem from the obligation to protect the material and moral 
interests of the creator.83  Alternatively, to the extent that one 
treats patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other intangible 
rights as property, a human right to intellectual property can 
be based in the obligation to protect property interests.84  The 
two international human rights instruments that are most 
pertinent to the discussion are the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights85 (UDHR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).86 
 
Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005) (noting that the courts 
have not recognized patents as constitutionally protected property rights). 
 81. Chapman, supra note 12, at 316–17. 
 82. For a comprehensive discussion of the human right to intellectual 
property, see Yu, supra note 7; Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights 
Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007); Wong, 
supra note 18; Yu, supra note 55. 
 83. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 27; International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights art. 15(1)(c), Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 84. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Mar. 23, 
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 85. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 17. 
 86. ICCPR, supra note 84.  This agreement is silent with respect to property 
as a human right or intellectual property as a human right. 
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There are also regional instruments that may provide a 
basis for individuals to make human rights based intellectual 
property claims, as was done in Budweiser.87  The European 
Union protects human rights through the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights, and the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (commonly 
referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights or 
ECHR).88  The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man (American Declaration)89 also requires human rights 
protections that may intersect with intellectual property law.  
While these instruments are applicable only within their 
relevant regions, the concepts are pertinent to the broader 
discussion.  The following discussion elaborates on the 
intersection between human rights and intellectual property. 
A. Material and Moral Interests 
The precise meaning of the human rights obligations as 
they relate to intellectual property law is uncertain and 
requires further consideration.90  However, human rights 
bodies have set out some of their interpretations of these 
obligations and how they may differ from intellectual 
property law.91  The language of the UDHR and the ICESCR 
evokes both patent and copyright law.  The right to protect 
 
 87. See supra notes 56–57. 
 88. Convention, supra note 2.  The Charter on Fundamental Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights became binding throughout the EU 
through the Treaty of Lisbon.  See EUROPA, Fundamental Rights within the 
European Union, available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_with
in_european_union/index_en.htm (“The European Union (EU) attaches great 
importance internally to human rights.  Its human rights principles are set out 
in the Treaty on the European Union and the Charter on Fundamental 
Rights.”).  The Treaty of Lisbon amended the Treaty on the European Union 
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community.  See EUROPA, Treaty of 
Lisbon, available at http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/full_text/index_en.htm (“The 
Treaty of Lisbon amends the EU’s two core treaties, the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.  The latter is 
renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  In addition, 
several Protocols and Declarations are attached to the Treaty.”). 
 89. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man art. XXIII, 
adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, 
Colombia, May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser. L./V/I.23 Rev. [hereinafter American 
Declaration]. 
 90. See General Comment No. 17, supra note 55. 
 91. Id. 
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material and moral interest resulting from literary or artistic 
productions sounds similar to copyright protection.92  The 
protection of material and moral interests resulting from 
scientific productions may overlap with patent law.93  The full 
scope of these rights is not yet understood, but the United 
Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
has offered some guidance in General Comment 17.94 
Specifically, Article 27 (2) states, “Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author.”95  Article 15 (1)(c) of the ICESCR provides for 
the protection of material and moral interests through 
language similar to that found in the UDHR.96  The same is 
true with respect to Article XIII of the American Declaration, 
which provides that everyone “has the right to the protection of 
his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or 
any literary, scientific or artistic works of which he is the 
author.”97 
As the ICESCR Committee observes, the right to benefit 
from the protection of the moral and material interests may 
not coincide with the level of protection or the means of 
protection provided through intellectual property law.98  The 
human right to the material and moral interests in one’s 
creations may not be identical to the rights extended by the 
current intellectual property law framework.99  In fact, 
intellectual property laws may fall short of protecting rights 
to creative works even if those works might be protectable 
under a human rights framework.100  For example, one may 
 
 92. Chapman, supra note 12. 
 93. Id. 
 94. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55. 
 95. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 27. 
 96. ICESCR, supra note 83, art. 15(1) (“The States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from 
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”). 
 97. American Declaration, supra note 89, art. XIII. 
 98. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, ¶ 10 (because the human right 
may differ from the scope of intellectual property rights under national law, the 
ICESCR Committee stressed the importance of not equating these two different 
of rights). 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 100. Wong, supra note 18, at 807. 
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be able to claim a human right to a creative work, even if the 
work fails to meet the standards for originality in copyright, 
or novelty under patent law.101  However, rights owners will 
tend to focus on the areas of overlap to advance their goals 
rather than the possible distinctions. 
The human right to material interests may overlap with 
the right to property.  Some commentators contend that the 
property right articulated in Article 17 of the UDHR may not 
be the basis for the right to the protection of material 
interests.102  However, others have argued that the right to 
“material interests” implies a right to own property.103  Even 
if one concludes that a material interest is something less 
than a property right, the language suggests some kind of 
proprietary or pecuniary interest. 
B. The Right to Property 
As one scholar argues, if the right to own property is a 
human right, and if copyright, trademarks, and patents are 
treated as property, then one might reasonably conclude that 
intellectual property rights are human rights.104  Although 
controversial in some respects,105 the right to own property 
and not to be arbitrarily deprived thereof, is an international 
human right.106  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) protects property rights, which arguably include 
intellectual property rights.  Article 17 (1) of the UDHR 
states: 
 
 101. In order to obtain a patent, an applicant must demonstrate that their 
invention is new, useful and non-obvious.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 
27. 
 102. Yu, supra note 55, at 734. 
 103. Wong, supra note 18, at 813–14. 
 104. Id. at 810 (“[I]nsofar as property ownership is a fundamental human 
right . . . and IPRs are property rights, it follows that IPRs are human rights.”). 
 105. Icelandic Human Rights Centre, The Right to Property (Nov. 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights project/humanrightsc 
asesandmaterials/humanrightsconceptsideasandfora/substantivehumanrights/t
herighttoproperty/ (“ One of the more controversial and complex human rights is 
the right to property.  The right is controversial because the very right which is 
seen by some as central to the human rights concept is considered by others to 
be an instrument for abuse, a right that protects the ‘haves’ against the ‘have-
nots.’  It is complex, because no other human right is subject to more 
qualifications and limitations and, consequently, no other right has resulted in 
more complex case-law of, for instance, the supervisory bodies of the ECHR.”). 
 106. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 17. 
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1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as 
in association with others, 
2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.107 
One could dispute the treatment of intangible property 
rights as “property” due to the differences between tangible 
property and rights in intangible goods.108  Indeed, the 
rationale for treating property as fundamental rights, 
including the desire to promote social order and stability, 
should arguably not be extended to intangible goods.109  
Nonetheless, courts have been willing to treat intellectual 
property rights as property interests, including within the 
human rights context.110  If patents, copyrights, trademarks 
and other intangible rights are treated as property, then this 
provides an additional basis for human rights claims. 
Although some may question whether or not the right to 
property in the UDHR includes private property,111 there is 
support for the view that the property rights referred to in 
human rights instruments include both communal and 
private property.  The right to property in Article 17 of the 
UDHR generated a significant amount of debate because 
some countries, like the United States, supported a right to 
private property, while others, like the former Soviet Union, 
wanted the property right to reflect different economic 
systems.112  Ultimately, as is the case with many 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Yu, supra note 55, at 732 (“Despite this modern-day tendency to 
consider intellectual property as private property, the international or regional 
human rights instruments neither endorse nor reject the use of property right 
to protect interests in intellectual creations.”). 
 109. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 62. 
 110. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007). 
 111. Yu, supra note 55, at 733. 
 112. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND 
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 182 (Random House 2001) 
(“Article 17 on property rights occasioned much debate.  The United States 
strongly supported a right to own private property and to be protected against 
public taking of private property without due safeguards.  The United 
Kingdom’s Labour government representatives, however, took the position that 
the article should be omitted, arguing that the regulation of property rights was 
so extensive everywhere in the modern world that it made no sense to speak of a 
right to ownership.  Many Latin Americans took an entirely different tack: they 
wanted the article to specify enough private property for a decent existence.  
The Soviets, for their part, object to the idea that a decent existence should be 
grounded in private property and insisted that the article should take account of 
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international agreements, the language was left vague 
enough to accommodate the views of different nations.113 
Neither the ICESCR nor the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contain a provision on the 
right to property.114  This was primarily due to the fact that 
the right to property was a politically sensitive issue between 
capitalist and socialist countries.115  However, the right to 
property is recognized in a number of human rights 
instruments, such as the American Declaration,116 the 
American Convention on Human Rights,117 and the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights.118  The European 
Convention on Human Rights119 also recognizes the right to 
private property,120 including intellectual property for both 
natural and legal persons.121 
TRIPS requires governments to compensate intellectual 
property owners for compulsory licensing.122  This provision 
creates an obligation, not unlike provisions on takings or 
expropriation of private property, to compensate the 
intellectual property owner for use without permission.  
Hence, even in the absence of express reference to property 
interests per se, TRIPS appears to be consistent with an 
 
the different economic systems in various countries.”). 
 113. Id. at 183. 
 114. See ICCPR, supra note 84. 
 115. Yu, supra note 55, at 733. 
 116. American Declaration, supra note 89, art. XXIII (“Every person has a 
right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and 
helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.”). 
 117. Signed at San José, Costa Rica, Nov. 22, 1969. 
 118. See African Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 14, June 27, 
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (“The right to 
property shall be guaranteed.  It may only be encroached upon in the interest of 
public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with 
the provisions of appropriate laws.”). 
 119. Rome, Italy, Nov. 4, 1950. 
 120. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Paris, France, Mar., 20, 1952 (“Every natural or 
legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.  No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international 
law.”). 
 121. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007). 
 122. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31(h) (“The right holder shall be 
paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into 
account the economic value of the authorization.”). 
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understanding of intellectual property rights as property 
interests of some kind. 
The question is whether a human right to property leads 
to a stronger property interest, or if the scope of any such 
human right is narrower than a legal property interest.  
Arguably, the interdependence and indivisibility of human 
rights limits the right to property to the extent that it 
interferes with other human rights.123  Yet this limitation 
generates additional complications.  For instance, when does 
the human right to intellectual property interfere with the 
human right to health?  Conversely, when does the human 
right to health interfere with the human right to intellectual 
property protection, and how would one balance these two 
competing interests?  Does the human rights framework offer 
superior balancing tools to those available under the extant 
intellectual property system?  Arguably, if intellectual property 
protection is not a human right, then the human right—as a 
natural entitlement—should prevail.  In addition, some human 
rights instruments limit the right to property.  For example, 
the American Declaration limits the property right to that “as 
meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain 
the dignity of the individual . . .” which suggests that one is 
only entitled to as much property as one needs.124  Certainly, 
this kind of language would be useful in tempering any claim to 
a very strong property interest.  The UDHR does not contain 
such language, but indicates that one can be deprived of one’s 
property as long as this is not done “arbitrarily.”125 
Moreover, in the current environment, it is doubtful that 
courts and governments, or treaty negotiators and industry 
associations that are looking to increase intellectual property 
protections will encourage a human rights balancing.126  Since 
patents, copyrights, and trademarks have already been 
strengthened by the characterization as property127 and as 
“trade-related,” the greatest risks from a human rights 
framework pertain primarily to the framing of intellectual 
 
 123. Nickel, supra note 6, at 984–85. 
 124. American Declaration, supra note 89, art. XXIII. 
 125. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 17. 
 126. See TPP, supra note 49, and ACTA, supra note 49, as recent examples of 
the upward ratchet. 
 127. See Carrier, supra note 79. 
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property protection as a natural entitlement.128  The global 
intellectual property system already favors intellectual 
property producers and largely fails to take human rights 
considerations into account.129  Treating intellectual property 
protection as a human right may simply exacerbate this 
problem.  However, using human rights law to constrain 
intellectual property could be an effective balancing strategy.  
This is because, as discussed below, the lens through which 
we view rights can impact their legal treatment. 
III. FRAMING: HUMAN RIGHTS & INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
A. The Distinct Purposes of Intellectual Property and 
Human Rights 
Intellectual property law could benefit from some human 
rights concepts.  However, these two areas of law are distinct 
in significant ways.  The UDHR is the core international 
instrument that sets out the generally recognized human 
rights and freedoms.130  Adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly after the establishment of the United 
Nations following the Second World War,131 the UDHR is not 
a binding treaty, but rather a set of aspirational principles.132  
However, scholars have suggested that UDHR has been 
incorporated into custom, as evidenced by various rules of 
customary international law such as those relating to 
torture.133 
While human rights law is based in international law, 
there is a relationship with American values, even if the 
United States does not apply international law in its domestic 
 
 128. But see Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of 
Value in Intellectual Property Theory, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY vol. 29, no. 
2 (2012) (using Lockean natural rights theory to argue that intellectual property 
rights are natural entitlements). 
 129. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and 
Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 805 (2007). 
 130. Donnelly, supra note 19, at 288 (“Virtually all states accept the 
authority of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”). 
 131. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 217A at its third session in Paris on December 10, 1948.  
UDHR, supra note 10. 
 132. See GLENDON, supra note 112, at 177. 
 133. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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courts.134  In fact, the United States played an important role 
in the development of the UDHR, with Eleanor Roosevelt 
chairing the Drafting Committee.135  In many respects, these 
international human rights principles are the result of 
American led efforts and philosophies.136  The same is true for 
the intellectual property rules that were implemented 
through TRIPS.  Human rights law and enforceable 
intellectual property standards were both developed through 
international instruments that were influenced by American 
philosophies. 
The two areas of law have little else in common.  The 
nature of human rights is distinct from the nature of 
intellectual property rights.  Human rights are inalienable 
rights enjoyed by all human beings.137  They are, therefore, 
also universal and indivisible.138  As universal rights that can 
be exercised by individuals against the state and society, 
human rights are often viewed as a means to achieve social 
values that improve the human condition.139  Hence, 
protecting human dignity is said to be the primary principle 
underlying human rights laws.  In addition, some human 
rights scholars characterize the protection of the weak and 
 
 134. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 135. United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: History of 
the Document (UDHR) (Nov. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml). 
 136. GLENDON, supra note 112, at xviii (“ When read as it was meant to be, 
namely as a whole, the Declarations’ vision of liberty is inseparable from it calls 
to social responsibility (inspired in part by Franklin Roosevelt’s famous ‘four 
freedoms’ —freedom of speech and belief, freedom from fear and from want).  Its 
organic unity was, however, one of the first casualties of the cold war.”). 
 137. Donnelly, supra note 19, at 283. 
 138. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Progamme of Action art. 5, World 
Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria, June 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] (“All human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.  The international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
same footing, and with the same emphasis.  While the significance of national 
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their 
political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”). 
 139. Donnelly, supra note 19, at 284 (“Human rights—equal and inalienable 
entitlements of all individuals that may be exercised against the state and 
society—are a distinctive way to seek to realize social values such as justice and 
human flourishing.”). 
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vulnerable as the goal of human rights law.140  Intellectual 
property laws, by comparison, are not designed to protect the 
weak and vulnerable, but to stimulate innovation and 
creativity.141 
The United Nations Committee on the ICESCR (the 
“Committee”), distinguishes between human rights, which it 
describes as “fundamental, inalienable[,] and universal 
entitlements” and intellectual property rights that are 
granted by states primarily to stimulate innovation and 
creativity.142  There are a number of other differences 
between human rights and intellectual property rights.  For 
instance, unlike human rights, intellectual property rights 
are time-limited, transferable, and revocable.143  By 
comparison, any human right to the protection of one’s 
creative or inventive work could presumably continue 
indefinitely.  Thus, framing intellectual property rights 
through a human rights lens could lend support to claims to 
perpetual rights that become difficult to  challenge or deny. 
The Committee also characterizes intellectual property 
as protecting “business and corporate interests and 
investments,” whereas the human right to the protection of 
material and moral interests preserves the personal link 
between the author and her creation and the author’s ability 
to enjoy an adequate standard of living.144  Clearly, however, 
intellectual property law is not limited to protecting 
 
 140. Sally Engle Merry et al., Law From Below: Women’s Human Rights and 
Social Movements in New York City, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 101, 102 (2010) 
(“Protecting the vulnerable and powerless is clearly fundamental to the 
aspirations of human rights.  The system of human rights law seeks to protect 
the dignity and well-being of all humans, regardless of their citizenship, race, 
gender, or class . . . . Human rights law promises the weakest and most 
excluded people protections equal to those of the wealthy and the privileged.”). 
 141. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 
8, pmbl.; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Megan M. Carpenter, Trademarks and 
Human Rights: Oil and Water? Or Chocolate and Peanut Butter?, 99 
TRADEMARK REP. 892, 901–02 (2009). 
 142. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, ¶ 1. 
 143. Id. ¶ 2. 
 144. Id. (“Whereas the human right to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic 
productions safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations 
and between peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural 
heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable 
authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes 
primarily protect business and corporate interests and investments.”). 
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businesses—it protects both natural and legal persons.145  
Indeed, some human rights protections, such as the right to 
freedom of expression and the right to property, have been 
extended to both natural and legal persons.  Could the same 
be true for a human right to intellectual property protection?  
If so, it may be erroneous to assume that human rights law 
will support a more balanced intellectual property system. 
B. Human Rights Principles to Constrain or Promote? 
The relationship between human rights and intellectual 
property is not immediately obvious.  Nonetheless, these two 
seemingly distinct fields can intersect in at least two ways.  
First, the “limiting approach” uses human rights to limit 
intellectual property protections when they interfere with 
other rights, like access to medicines or freedom of speech.146  
The human rights framework can also be used to contemplate 
intellectual property protection as a human right.147  This 
Article focuses on the latter because this approach could 
result in the use of human rights law to expand intellectual 
property protections.148 
Some human rights scholars have advocated taking 
human rights obligations into account in order to limit 
intellectual property excesses.  For instance, Molly Land 
argues that governments should “limit the effects of 
intellectual property rights in order to protect international 
human rights.”149  Peter Yu proposes the use of a human 
rights framework for intellectual property on the basis that 
 
 145. Megan M. Carpenter, Intellectual property: A human (not corporate) 
right, in FORGOTTEN RIGHTS, FORGOTTEN CONCEPTS 312, 312–13 (2012) (“The 
temptation to categorize intellectual property rights as solely a vehicle for 
protection of corporate interests is great . . . . And while corporate interests 
dominate, as they do in other areas of human rights such as the food industry or 
the health industry, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fundamental policies 
behind intellectual property law, particularly the interests of the humans 
behind human creativity.”). 
 146. An example would be the access to medicines movement.  For instance, 
although the Doha Declaration, supra note 43, does not explicitly reference 
human rights law, it advocates a balancing between the public health and 
intellectual property protection. 
 147. See Wong, supra note 18. 
 148. Helfer, supra note 82, at 1015–18. 
 149. Molly Beutz Land, Intellectual Property Rights and the Right to 
Participate in Cultural Life at 1, INST FOR INFO. LAW & POLICY, White Paper 
Series 08/09 No. 2 (2009). 
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such a framework is “socially beneficial and that it will enable 
the development of a balanced intellectual property 
system.”150  One of the early advocates of a human rights 
approach to intellectual property, Audrey Chapman, suggests 
that human rights would require that intellectual property 
laws “facilitate and promote scientific progress and its 
application and do so in a manner that will broadly benefit 
members of society on an individual as well as collective 
level.”151  Laurence Helfer advocates a human rights 
framework for intellectual property in which intellectual 
property is employed as a tool to achieve human rights ends.  
Under this framework, Helfer suggests that intellectual 
property rules should be modified when they hinder human 
rights outcomes.152  These proposals are consistent with the 
limiting approach and they are more likely to curtail, rather 
than exacerbate, the potential excesses of intellectual 
property law.  These authors seem to be seeking a way for 
intellectual property rules to work harmoniously with human 
rights norms and possibly to have intellectual property law 
help promote human rights objectives. 
There is, however, another aspect to the human rights 
and intellectual property discussion—one that could have an 
effect contrary to the goal of achieving more balance in the 
global intellectual property system.  The human rights 
framework is not restricted to curtailing intellectual property 
rights but also encompasses the notion of promoting a right to 
intellectual property protection as a human right.  Noting the 
importance of intellectual property in the information 
economy, Chapman argues that legal instruments and 
decisions can have “significant ramifications” for the 
 
 150. Yu, supra note 7, at 1123. 
 151. Chapman, supra note 7. 
 152. Helfer, supra note 82, at 1018 (“A third human rights framework for 
intellectual property . . . first specifies the minimum outcomes—in terms of 
health, poverty, education, and so forth—that human rights law requires of 
states.  The framework next works backwards to identify different mechanisms 
available to states to achieve those outcomes.  Intellectual property plays only a 
secondary role in this version of the framework.  Where intellectual property 
law helps to achieve human rights outcomes, governments should embrace it.  
Where it hinders those outcomes, its rules should be modified . . . . But the focus 
remains on the minimum level of human well-being that states must provide, 
using either appropriate intellectual property rules or other means.”). 
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protection of human rights.153  She asserts, therefore, that it 
is “important for the human rights community to claim the 
rights of the author, creator and inventor, whether an 
individual, a group or a community, as a human right.”154  
Peter Yu also discusses using a human rights framework to 
protect creators’ material and moral interests while using 
intellectual property rules to promote other human rights.155  
Similarly, Mary Wong, discussing copyright law, argues that 
there is a human right to intellectual property protection that 
encompasses both moral rights and property rights.156 
These scholars have made thoughtful arguments that are 
appealing insofar as they describe the use of human rights 
law primarily as a tool to empower human producers or users 
of intellectual property protected goods.  Using human rights 
to ameliorate the potential deleterious effects of intellectual 
property rights on human interests seems consistent with the 
goal of achieving greater balance between protecting 
intellectual property owners and promoting other societal 
goals.  However, characterizing intellectual property as a 
human right has the potential to lead to undesirable 
consequences. 
Kal Raustiala, for instance, queries whether the 
marriage of intellectual property and human rights will make 
intellectual property rights “more socially just, or just more 
powerful.”157  Raustiala cautions that in the current 
environment of ever increasing intellectual property 
protections,158 a human rights approach to intellectual 
property could “entrench some dangerous ideas” about the 
inviolable nature of property rights as human rights.159  If one 
 
 153. Chapman, supra note 12, at 308. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Yu, supra note 7, at 1149 (“The successful development of a human 
rights framework for intellectual property not only will offer individuals the 
well-deserved protection of their moral and material interests in intellectual 
creations, but also will allow states to harness the intellectual property system 
to protect human dignity and respect as well as to promote the full realization of 
other important human rights.”). 
 156. Wong, supra note 18. 
 157. Raustiala, supra note 38, at 1023. 
 158. Id. at 1034 (“Traditional knowledge is hardly the only area in which new 
international-protected IP rights have been proposed: there are efforts 
underway today to negotiate new international rules on broadcast rights, 
audiovisual performances, and patents, as well as . . . geographic indications.”). 
 159. Id. at 1023. 
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cannot violate such rights, the effect will be to further 
strengthen intellectual property rights, rather than weaken 
them.160  Raustiala refers to the efforts to protect indigenous 
traditional knowledge161 as an example of the dangerous 
proliferation of intellectual property rights.162  Although 
seemingly sympathetic to the plight of indigenous peoples, he 
cautions that new international property rules are not the 
solution.163 
Robert Ostergard criticizes the concept of intellectual 
property rights as human rights because they may conflict 
with other human rights that should be prioritized.164  He 
further objects to promoting human rights to intellectual 
property because it would allow intellectual property 
producers to promote their interests while ignoring national 
development objectives.165  In my view, the case against a 
human right to intellectual property protection becomes even 
stronger if multinational corporations can utilize the 
framework to their benefit. 
C. The Risks of Promoting a Human Right to Intellectual 
 
 160. Id. at 1032 (“ Just as the popularization of the term ‘intellectual 
property’  probably helped raise the salience of the underlying rights of patent, 
copyright, trademark, and the like—and likely enhanced political support for 
government intervention to protect these rights by tapping into the strong 
respect for property rights present in many parts of the world—the introduction 
of human rights language to the policy debate over IP may have a similar 
strengthening influence.”). 
 161. The World Intellectual Property Organization defines traditional 
knowledge as follows: “Traditional knowledge (TK) is knowledge, know-how, 
skills and practices that are developed, sustained and passed on from 
generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its cultural 
or spiritual identity.”  WIPO, supra note 45.  For example, traditional 
knowledge includes Yoga and traditional medicinal knowledge. 
 162. Raustiala, supra note 38, at 1032. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Ostergard Jr., supra note 77, at 175–76 (“The declaration of IP as a 
universal human right is problematic within the framework of physical well-
being established in this article because the UN position does not recognize the 
hierarchy of IP that exists.  Under the Universal Declaration, the registered 
trademark for a multinational corporation is accorded the same importance and 
protection as a patent for medicinal purposes.”). 
 165. Id. at 175 (“By promoting IP as a guaranteed right, the [Universal] 
Declaration gives IP producers significant latitude in abrogating any 
responsibility to promote national development, though producers often argue 
for greater access to foreign markets and the protection of IP in those 
markets.”). 
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Property 
Adopting human rights principles is not a purely 
theoretical consideration.  This framework can have practical 
implications for intellectual property law.166  The approach 
taken to intellectual property, whether trade-based or human 
rights-oriented, and the terminology used with respect to 
intellectual property rights can shift our understanding of the 
nature of the rights.167  The way we frame global discussions 
about intellectual property can, therefore, influence our 
understanding of intellectual property rights, perhaps even 
more than the language of specific legislative instruments.168 
In addition to being comprised of a set of laws, human 
rights law has been described as encompassing a set of 
values, whose “core ideas are human dignity, equality, 
nondiscrimination, protection of bodily integrity from state 
violence as well as other forms of violence, and 
freedom . . . .”169  These values, derived from the European 
Enlightenment and the American Revolution, are generally 
believed to represent the consensus of the international 
community.170  Thus, as a set of values and beliefs, a human 
 
 166. Raustiala, supra note 38, at 1036 (“While well-intentioned, human 
rights rhetoric may aid, rather than hinder, the efforts at enclosure and in the 
process exacerbate an already troubling erosion of the public domain.  This is 
not to imply that there is little that is positive in the expanding marriage of 
human rights and IP.  As noted above, there are significant efforts to use 
human rights instruments and concepts to roll back some of the more egregious 
elements of TRIPS.”). 
 167. Id. at 1032 (“ Just as the popularization of the term ‘intellectual 
property’  probably helped raise the salience of the underlying rights of patent, 
copyright, trademark, and the like—and likely enhanced political support for 
government intervention to protect these rights by tapping into the strong 
respect for property rights present in many parts of the world—the introduction 
of human rights language to the policy debate over IP may have a similar 
strengthening influence.”); SELL, supra note 47, at 5 (“The way that issues are 
framed can make a great deal of difference in terms of what is and what is not 
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 168. Raustiala, supra note 38, at 1037 (“More significant than any specific 
agreement or text are the possible political effects of incorporating the human 
rights paradigm into IP law . . . . [T]he risk is that the language and politics of 
human rights, as it filters into the language and politics of IP rights, will make 
it harder for governments to resist the sirens songs of those seeking ever more 
powerful legal entitlements.”). 
 169. Merry et al., supra note 140, at 107. 
 170. Id. (“ Although these values are widespread, a central aspect of the 
human rights system is the way its legal apparatus legitimates its core 
principles by claiming that they represent the consensus of the ‘international 
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rights approach is not strictly a matter applying pertinent 
human rights laws.  Intellectual property norms can be 
informed by human rights values, even in the absence of 
controlling law.171 
Merging intellectual property and international trade has 
altered our understanding and characterization of intellectual 
property at a global level.172  In addition, scholars observe 
that the “propertization” of patent, copyright, and trademark 
has changed not only the narrative, but also the legal 
treatment of intangible rights.173  As Michael Carrier 
explains, the “propertization” of intellectual property has 
been part of the trend towards making intellectual property 
rights stronger.174  Liam O’Melinn decries the framing of 
copyright and patents as property as an attempt at “a subtle 
but decisive shift in the purpose of intellectual property law 
in the direction of purely private entitlement and away from 
any public benefit.”175  In this way, characterizing intellectual 
property rights as property is consistent with the trend 
towards increased intellectual property protection.176  The 
discussion of patents, copyrights and trademarks as property 
has shaped our understanding of intellectual property rights 
and, as some scholars have observed, it has affected the 
nature of the rights by making them stronger.  Intellectual 
 
community.’   This value system grows out of a long history of human rights 
advocacy dating from the European Enlightenment, and the articulation of its 
values in the French Revolution, the American Revolution, the anti-slavery 
movement and many others.”). 
 171. For instance, the access to medicines movement, which can be supported 
on the basis of the right to health that is articulated in Article 25 of the UDHR, 
is an example of using human rights principles to impact intellectual property 
law.  UDHR, supra note 10, art. 25.  The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health is a concrete result of the efforts to address some of the negative effects 
of intellectual property rights on access to medicines. 
 172. I have argued this point more fully elsewhere.  See Osei-Tutu, supra 
note 28. 
 173. Carrier, supra note 79, at 5 (“The propertization of IP is in fact 
unfortunate.  But it also appears to be irreversible.”); Liam Séamus O’Melinn, 
Software and Shovels: How the Intellectual Property Revolution is Undermining 
Traditional Concepts of Property, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 144 (2007). 
 174. Carrier, supra note 79, at 10 (“In continually strengthening IP, courts 
have characterized it as a type of property.”). 
 175. O’Melinn, supra note 173, at 144. 
 176. The “upward ratchet,” as it has been described, is apparent in 
agreements like the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, ACTA, supra note 49, 
TPP, supra note 49, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 
112 Stat. 2860 (1998), and copyright term extension, to name a few examples. 
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property rights are explicitly recognized in the TRIPS 
Agreement as private rights177 and they are now generally 
recognized as property rights,178 despite some suggestions 
that they would be more appropriately characterized as 
privileges.179 
The characterization of copyrights, patents, and other 
intangible rights as human rights may further hinder the 
ability of governments to limit such rights where they 
interfere with competing social and policy goals.  A human 
right to intellectual property protection drives intellectual 
property law further towards the language of rights rather 
than the more limiting language of privileges.180  It also 
promotes a natural rights approach to intellectual property 
law rather than a utilitarian one.181 
The utilitarian approach views intellectual property as a 
tool to achieve a certain end, rather than an inherent right.182  
The advantage of the utilitarian conception of intellectual 
property law is that the entitlement can be interpreted in 
light of the objectives of the law, and not on some asserted 
natural right of the intellectual property owner.  Consistent 
with the utilitarian approach to intellectual property,183 the 
goals of patent and copyright law in the United States are 
regularly interpreted in light of the stated Constitutional 
objective: “to promote the progress of science and the useful 
 
 177. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, pmbl. (recognizing that “intellectual 
property rights are private rights . . . .”). 
 178. Wong, supra note 18, at 777 (“ We generally accept that the legal rights 
associated with intellectual property (‘IP’ ) are those that flow from the fact that 
it is property and can be owned, thereby importing fundamental concepts of 
property law, such as excludability and alienability, into IP law.”). 
 179. PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (Ashgate 
1996). 
 180. Shaver, supra note 7. 
 181. See Donnelly, supra note 19, at 286 (“Natural or human rights ideas 
first developed in the modern West.  A full-fledged natural rights theory is 
evident in John Locke’s Second Treaties of Government, published in 1689 in 
support of the so-called Glorious Revolution.  The American and French 
Revolutions first used such ideas to construct new political orders.”). 
 182. DRAHOS, supra note 179, at 5. 
 183. Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social Progress: 
The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 606 
(2003) (“Beginning with the first Patent Act of 1790 and continuing through the 
adoption of the Berne Convention Standards in 1989, the basis given for Anglo-
American systems of intellectual property has been utilitarian in nature, and 
not grounded in the natural rights of the author or inventor.”). 
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arts.”184 
Like the “propertization” of intellectual property, a 
natural rights conception of intellectual property will have 
the tendency to lead to greater protection of the 
entitlement.185  This is because such discussion centers less 
on the question of whether the laws are promoting “progress” 
and more on the asserted natural right of the creator to this 
legal protection—either based on labor theory or the natural 
extension of the person theory.186  In the context of a natural 
rights approach, one can argue more effectively to restrict the 
ability of the state to limit such rights, regardless of whether 
the goal of promoting progress is being achieved or impeded. 
Similarly, contemplating intellectual property through a 
human rights lens can alter the way we understand, 
characterize, and develop intellectual property at a global 
level.  Prioritizing human rights, like freedom of 
expression,187 or less widely accepted rights like the right to 
food,188 over state-granted intellectual property rights shifts 
the balance in favor of access instead of protection.  By 
contrast, treating intellectual property protection as a human 
right could make it more difficult to place limitations on 
intellectual property rights.189 
Of course, human rights law permits, under certain 
circumstances, the imposition of limits, albeit only to the 
extent that may reasonably be necessary, and often for a 
limited period of time.190  The concept of indivisibility of 
human rights—that all human rights are interdependent and 
that all rights must be respected—naturally imports some 
balance into a human rights system because there is no 
 
 184. U.S, CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 185. See Carrier, supra note 79, at 10. 
 186. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4–9 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2011). 
 187. UDHR, supra note 10; ICCPR, supra note 84. 
 188. UDHR, supra note 10; ICESCR, supra note 83. 
 189. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 514. The Supreme Court has 
clearly stated that the public domain is not inviolable.  See Golan v Holder, 132 
S. Ct. (2012) 873, 891 (“However spun, these contentions depend on an 
argument we considered and rejected above, namely that the Constitution 
renders the public domain largely untouchable by Congress.”). 
 190. See ICCPR, supra note 84, Art. 4; Hafner-Burton et. al, Emergency and 
Escape: Explaining Derogations From Human Rights Treaties, 65 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 673, 676 (2011). 
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hierarchy of rights.191  However, as intellectual property and 
human rights serve fundamentally different purposes, the 
balance that is struck under intellectual property law may be 
distinct from that which is reached under human rights law.  
Thus, under the human rights framework for intellectual 
property, there may be times when intellectual property law 
performs the balancing function and times when human 
rights laws would provide the necessary guidance. 
In balancing the interests of an intellectual property 
owner against the human right to health, for instance, the 
balancing of interests should favor the human right to health.  
For instance, access to medicines, formulated as part of the 
right to health under Article 25 of the UDHR, could be 
prioritized over the twenty-year patent term.  Prioritizing 
human rights can be attributed to the goal of protecting 
human dignity as well as the state’s ability to limit rights 
that are granted as a concession of the state.  Under this 
analysis, fundamental human rights trump limited state-
granted rights.  In the context of international law, it could be 
argued, at least theoretically, that intellectual property rights 
should not interfere with inviolable human rights.  However, 
if the patent right is characterized as a human right, it 
becomes less clear that other human rights, such as the right 
to health, should be prioritized.  A human right to patent 
protection would be an inviolable right and therefore, at least 
conceptually, stronger than the twenty-year limited patent 
right that is currently available in all WTO member states. 
Some of the concerns about strengthening intellectual 
property rights may be alleviated by concluding that 
corporations cannot claim that they have a human right to 
intellectual property protection.192  Some scholars and human 
rights experts see the framework as excluding corporations.193  
If the human rights aspects extend only to natural persons, 
 
 191. Vienna Declaration, supra note 138, ¶ 5 (“All human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.  The international 
community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the 
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 192. Yu, supra note 55, at 728. 
 193. Chapman, supra note 7; Yu, supra note 7. 
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and not to legal persons, then the potential for expansion of 
intellectual property rights seems less significant.  
Individuals would be able to assert their rights against 
corporations that own the intellectual property but the 
reverse would not hold true.194  However, corporations have 
not been completely precluded from using human rights law 
to protect their intellectual property interests.195  It is 
reasonable to anticipate that, given the opportunity, 
corporations would utilize human rights laws or principles to 
support their intellectual property claims. 
In his analysis of the human right to intellectual 
property, Peter Yu responds to three areas of critique.196  The 
first is that the elevation of intellectual property to the status 
of human rights is undesirable; the second is the risk of 
institutional capture by powerful rights holders; and the third 
is that the human rights framework is a Western concept that 
is not necessarily well suited to non-Western countries.197  
This Article focuses on the first two challenges that Yu 
identified.  However, rather than accepting that corporations 
are naturally excluded from the framework, this Article 
considers the possibility of corporate claims to intellectual 
property protection based on human rights principles. 
How corporations fit into the human rights framework 
for intellectual property is partially determined by differing 
theoretical approaches to corporations.  As our conception of 
the corporation evolves, so does the corporation’s ability to 
assert its rights.  Thus, any human rights approach to 
intellectual property must take into consideration the 
potential for legal persons to use human rights law to frame 
their claims. 
IV. CORPORATIONS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
FRAMEWORK 
The question of corporations asserting rights based on 
human rights laws or principles is more complex than it may 
 
 194. Yu, supra note 7, at 1128–1131 (arguing that corporate intellectual 
property rights would have no human rights basis and therefore cannot rise to 
the level of human rights). 
 195. See generally Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007). 
 196. Yu, supra note 7, at 1124. 
 197. Id. 
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initially appear.  In response to skepticism about the utility of 
human rights for intellectual property law, some scholars who 
support the use of a human rights framework for intellectual 
property dismiss the possibility that corporations could claim 
a human right to intellectual property protection.198  As 
Chapman writes with respect to patents and copyrights, “a 
strong case can be made that a human rights approach 
requires that individuals, but not legal entities like 
corporations, be accorded the moral and material benefits” 
under Article 15 of the ICESCR.199  After all, human rights 
are for human beings and not for artificial persons that were 
created by law.200  In addition, human rights law may be seen 
as way to protect the weak and the vulnerable, rather than 
corporations that may have more wealth and power than 
some countries.201  However, some human rights are 
enshrined as fundamental rights in domestic constitutions 
and extended to legal persons.   
As Laurence Helfer and Graeme Austin observe in their 
treatise on intellectual property and human rights: 
Protecting the intellectual property of corporations under 
the rubric of fundamental rights may strike many 
observers as fundamentally misguided.  But the text and 
drafting history of several human rights treaties reveal a 
desire to protect the possessory interests of both 
businesses and natural persons.  In particular . . . the rule 
of law in general and the stability and predictability of 
property rights would be undermined if governments 
could arbitrarily deprive any class of owners of their 
possessions . . . .202 
While recognizing that governments may limit property 
 
 198. See Chapman, supra note 12, at 316; Yu, supra note 55, at 728–30; 
General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, ¶ 4. 
 199. Chapman, supra note 12, at 317. 
 200. Id. at 316 (“By its very nature, a human right is vested in individuals, 
and in a few instances a community, but never in an economic corporation.  Nor 
is there a basis in human rights to justify using intellectual property 
instruments as a means to protect economic investments.”). 
 201. Merry et al., supra note 140, at 102 (“Protecting the vulnerable and 
powerless is clearly fundamental to the aspirations of human rights.  The 
system of human rights law seeks to protect the dignity and well-being of all 
humans, regardless of their citizenship, race, gender, or class . . . .  Human 
rights law promises the weakest and most excluded people protections equal to 
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 202. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 62. 
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interests in favor of particular social and economic objectives, 
Helfer and Austin do not characterize a human right to 
intellectual property as excluding legal persons.203 
The extension of human rights laws to corporations 
applies only to some human rights.  If there is a rational basis 
for protecting corporate property rights in the context of a 
human rights framework, then arguably this can include 
patents, copyrights and trademarks as well.  Moreover, it has 
been suggested that in light of the efforts to hold 
transnational corporations accountable for violations of 
international human rights law, legal persons should be 
recognized as having rights under the law.204  It would be 
inaccurate to characterize legal persons as being entitled to 
human rights as a general claim.  Nonetheless, if the goal of 
the human rights framework for intellectual property is to 
improve human outcomes in areas like health, food, and 
access to knowledge, then corporate claims must be 
considered. The potential for legal persons to successfully 
expand intellectual property protections by framing their 
claims using human rights concepts is pertinent to the 
ultimate utility of the framework.  Corporate human rights-
based claims are not without support in theory and existing 
jurisprudence. 
As previously noted, the European Convention on Human 
Rights recognizes that corporations can assert human rights 
protection for their intellectual property.205 There is no 
equivalent regime in the United States.  However, the United 
States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, while not directly applicable to the 
intellectual property and human rights framework, provides a 
useful analytical lens.206  In this case, the Supreme Court 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Lucien J. Dhooge, Human Rights for Transnational Corporations, 16 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 197, 200 (2007) (“This article posits that transnational 
corporations possess legal personality sufficient to be granted rights in a 
manner similar to those granted to human beings in modern human rights law.  
In recognizing such status, the article contends that transnational are rights-
carrying persons in addition to being duty-bearing entities.”). 
 205. See Annheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 36 (Grand Chamber 2007). 
 206. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), 130 Sup. 
Ct. 876 (concluding that a “prohibition on corporate independent expenditure is 
an outright ban on speech.”).  Id. at 882 (declining to limit the free speech rights 
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considered corporate claims regarding the right to free 
speech, which is both a constitutional right207 and an 
international human right.208  Noting that corporate speech 
has long been protected in the United States,209 the Court 
concluded that the political speech of corporations is also 
protected.210  The Court rejected the argument that 
corporations’ political speech should not be protected because 
they are not natural persons.211 The Court also grappled with 
the exercise of corporate rights in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.212 
It is true that such cases have no precedential value in 
the intellectual property and human rights context.213  
Indeed, the international human rights framework is not 
directly applicable in the United States,214 and American law 
does not directly impact international human rights law.  
Nonetheless, the principles that guided the Citizens United 
decision are helpful in discussing human rights and 
fundamental rights in relation to corporations.  In particular, 
if the basis for distinguishing between legal and natural 
persons, or between different kinds of legal persons, is 
rejected by courts or other actors, the assertion that a human 
right to intellectual property cannot include corporate 
persons may need to be more adequately supported. 
 
of non-media corporations). 
 207. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 208. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 18, states, 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone 
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art. 18. 
 209. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 130 Sup. Ct. 876 at 883 (“The Court has 
recognized that First Amendment Protection applies to corporations.”). Id. 
 210. Id. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that.”). Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–83 (2104).  
In this case, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act prohibition on the government substantially burdening a 
“ person’s ” free exercise of religion includes corporate persons.  Id. 
 213. First, the rights in question are different; second, a U.S. constitutional 
law decision does not set a legal precedent for the interpretation of international 
human rights obligations.  Nonetheless, the principles from the case are 
consistent with a trend towards the increased protection of corporate interests, 
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 214. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); Merry 
et al., supra note 140, at 103 (“Historically, human rights were meant for 
export, not for domestic consumption.”). 
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An analytic approach that refuses to distinguish natural 
persons from legal persons could be applied to other 
fundamental rights that are enjoyed by both natural persons 
and corporations.  This includes intellectual property claims 
that are based on human rights law or principles.  Given that 
both legal and natural persons own patents, trademarks, and 
copyrights, is it possible that emphasizing the human rights 
aspects of intellectual property could end up primarily 
benefitting corporations?215  Ultimately, even commentators 
who argue that corporations cannot claim human rights per 
se acknowledge that corporations could, through national law, 
assert rights that are based on human rights law.216 
Importantly, the human rights framework, should it 
become widely accepted, could have a significant impact in 
nations that incorporate international human rights 
principles when interpreting their domestic laws.217  Indeed, 
many countries attempt to interpret their domestic laws as 
consistent with their international obligations.218  
Furthermore, to the extent that a human rights lens becomes 
part of the intellectual property dialogue, we must 
 
 215. Helfer, supra note 82, at 1015 (“In this vision of the future . . . industries 
and interest groups that rely upon intellectual property for their economic well-
being would invoke the authors’ rights provisions and property rights provisions 
in human rights treaties to further augment existing standards of 
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 216. Yu, supra note 7, at 1130 (“ To be certain, even though the protection of 
human rights is limited to individuals, countries are free to extend through 
national legislations ‘human-rights’  like protection to corporations or other 
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 217. Michael Kirby, J., The Role of International Standards in Australian 
Courts, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 704, 705 (Steiner & 
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 218. Jorg Polakiewicz, The Application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in Domestic Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT 1001, 1003 (Steiner & Alston eds. 2000) (“It is common practice in 
many countries that the courts give statutes, wherever possible, an 
interpretation which is in line with the Convention.  National courts are indeed 
required to ensure that international responsibility of their country arising from 
wrongful application of or disrespect for rules of public international law be 
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contemplate interpretations of intellectual property 
obligations not only under domestic law, but also within the 
context of TRIPS.219 
The intellectual property standards in the TRIPS 
Agreement were shaped by the interests of intellectual 
property producing industries and their representative 
organizations.220  A handful of powerful corporations are 
credited with the standardized approach to intellectual 
property rights that are reflected in the TRIPS Agreement.221  
The trend towards greater intellectual property protection is 
evident from the various bilateral agreements222 as well as 
negotiations on multilateral agreements like the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement.223  We should expect this 
upward trend to continue.224  Thus, even if the ultimate goal 
is to limit the ability of corporations to benefit from a human 
rights framework for intellectual property, this can be best 
achieved by first acknowledging the potential for corporations 
to appropriate a human rights lens for their own benefit.  
This analysis will depend, to some extent, on how we 
understand the corporation. 
A. Who is the Corporation? 
This Article does not attempt to engage in a 
comprehensive analysis of corporations and their role in 
society.  However, in contemplating whether a corporation 
can claim human rights to its intellectual property, one must 
 
 219. The relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and other international 
agreements that reference intellectual property rights raises a number of 
interesting questions that go beyond the scope of this paper. 
 220. STIGLITZ, supra note 25, at 116; SELL, supra note 47, at 96–97. 
 221. SELL, supra note 47, at 96 (“In effect, twelve corporations made public 
law for the world.”). 
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 224. James M. Buchanan, Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems, in 
THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMICS 11, 16–17 
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give some consideration to the question: who is the 
corporation? 
There are two predominant theoretical articulations of 
the corporation.225  First, the concession theory postulates 
that corporations are created by the state and have only the 
rights that are granted to them by the state.226  Thus, under 
the concession theory it is acceptable for the government to 
restrict the activities of corporations.227  The second theory is 
the aggregate or contractual theory, which treats corporations 
as a collective of individuals who have come together under 
the form of the corporation.228  Under this theory, the 
corporation is seen as based on private contracts between 
individuals.229  These individuals do not lose the rights they 
would enjoy as individuals merely because they came 
together to form a legal entity.230  Other theorists describe the 
corporation as a kind of “super person” that has received 
extensive protection from the law.231  According to the real 
entity theory of the corporation, the corporation is viewed as 
having an existence of its own, one that is distinct from its 
shareholders and that is not controlled by the state.  If 
corporations are viewed in this light, they are more easily 
characterized as having natural rights.232 
The currently prevailing theory of corporate personality 
 
 225. Liam Séamus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public 
Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 201 (2006) 
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 229. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 203 (“ In 
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 230. Pollman, supra note 226, at 1641–42. 
 231. O’ Melinn, supra note 225, at 201 (“This Article challenges the two 
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2015] CORPORATE “HUMAN RIGHTS” 43 
in the United States is the contract or aggregate theory.233  If 
one analyzes corporate rights based on the aggregate theory 
of the corporation, there will be a tendency to equate the 
rights of the legal person with those of the natural person 
unless the right is one which is clearly not applicable to a 
legal person—like the right to be free from torture.  To an 
even greater extent than the contract or aggregate theory of 
the corporation, treatment of the corporation as some kind of 
natural super person lends itself to the conclusion that the 
corporation should have the same rights as a natural 
person.234  As one scholar writes, the corporation “is far better 
viewed as an immortal being with a soul, its existence and its 
entitlements based neither on sovereign grace nor on 
contracts entered into by rugged individuals, but on a moral 
personality distinct from that of both the individual and the 
state.”235 
Clearly, the concession theory provides the strongest 
basis for the state to limit the role of the corporation.236  
Under the concession theory, which is no longer prevalent, 
one could more confidently assert that corporations are 
naturally excluded from a human rights framework.  
However, if the law indeed treats the corporation as an 
aggregate of individuals, who do not lose their rights by 
virtue of being a collective, or as a “super person,” then any 
assumption that corporations will be frustrated in their 
efforts to claim human rights to their intellectual property is 
flawed. 
Another consideration that is pertinent to the human 
rights discussion is the nature of the corporation.  
 
 233. O’Melinn, supra note 225, at 203 (“In recent years, the contractual view 
has become increasingly dominant, and although the concession theorists have 
provided continuous resistance, the contractual theory has nonetheless defined 
the terms of the discussion.”). 
 234. Id. (“The modern corporation is a social force and legal person without 
peer, an exceptional person treated unlike other persons before the law.  The 
corporation has truly become a new kind of juristic person, defying the 
traditional categories of law and occupying a privileged place akin to that of an 
aristocracy.”). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Pollman, supra note 226, at 1635 (“Under this view, the corporation is a 
legal fiction and incorporation a special privilege awarded by the state.  
Accordingly, this view supported the government-imposed limitations on 
corporations of the time because if incorporation is a state grant, it follows that 
it can be a limited one.”). 
44 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
Corporations can be private business corporations, or they 
may be municipal corporations or public not-for profit entities 
like churches and universities.237  Should it matter whether 
the corporation is a large for-profit entity like the Monsanto 
Company,238 or an indigenous group that wants to protect its 
traditional knowledge? 
Monsanto, for example, is a multinational corporation. It 
is also a corporation  that has outraged many due to its 
aggressive stance on its intellectual property, genetically 
modified organisms and its treatment of farmers.239  For 
instance, the film Food, Inc.240 was highly critical of Monsanto 
and other large food companies.  The Food, Inc. film 
generated sufficient consumer reaction that Monsanto has 
attempted to respond to consumer criticisms, including 
concerns about its aggressive enforcement of its patents.241  
Critics of transnational corporations, like Monsanto, may be 
highly uncomfortable with the prospect of these companies 
using human rights law to argue for stronger patent rights.  
By comparison, the Seminole Tribe242 of Florida is a federally 
recognized American Indian tribe with a proud history and 
culture.243  It may even have culture and traditions that it 
would like to have protected as traditional knowledge.244 
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Advocates of the human rights framework for intellectual 
property also tend to be supportive of a collective right to 
traditional knowledge.245  One might argue that since 
traditional knowledge holders tend to be groups, their claims 
will be similar to those of the legal person from the 
perspective of aggregate theory.  Indeed, as is the case of the 
Seminole Tribe, some of these indigenous groups may be 
legally incorporated persons.  Not only is the Seminole Tribe 
a federal corporation, it is a wealthy corporation,246 and the 
owner of the Hard Rock Café.247  This is but one example of 
the complexity of the arguments and the potential actors who 
might seek to benefit from a human right to intellectual 
property protection. 
Overall, the right to moral interests is not easily 
extendable to corporations if these rights are analyzed 
pursuant to a natural rights approach to intangible creations 
and in line with the view that the creativity is an expression 
of the human self.248  It is also initially difficult to envision 
how the material or moral interests of the creator could be 
 
knowledge as follows: “Traditional knowledge (TK) is knowledge, know-how, 
skills and practices that are developed, sustained and passed on from 
generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its cultural 
or spiritual identity.”  WIPO, supra note 45. 
 245. Chapman, supra note 12; Helfer, supra note 82. 
 246. Dara Kam, State cashing in on extra $4.3 million of Seminole gambling 
money, NEWS SERV. OF FLORIDA (Oct. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2013/oct/22/state-cashing-in-on-extra-43-
million-of-seminole/ (“With the expiration of a gambling deal with the Seminole 
Indians on the horizon, the tribe for the first time has raked in so much money 
that it sent an extra $4.3 million to the state.”). 
 247. See Hard Rock Café International, Inc., Seminole Ownership, 
http://www.hardrock.com/corporate/ownership.aspx (“In 2004, the Seminole 
Tribe opened two Seminole Hard Rock Hotels and Casinos in Florida.  With the 
March 2007 acquisition of the Hard Rock brand, the Seminole Tribe of Florida 
added the prestige of one of the world’s most respected brands.”).  The deal 
excluded the Hard Rock Las Vegas casino as well as the one in London, 
England, and rights to Hard Rock intellectual property in Brazil, Australia, 
Israel, Venezuela and much of the Western United States.  See NBC News, 
Seminole Tribe buys Hard Rock café business (Dec. 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/16090321/ns/business-world_business/t/seminole-
tribe-buys-hard-rock-cafe-business/#.VGbogvnF-Ck. 
 248. General Comment No. 17, supra note 55, ¶ 12 (“ The protection of the 
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considered applicable to anyone other than a natural person, 
particularly since only a natural person can be a creator.  Yet, 
a group of persons could be considered the “creator.”249  In the 
dialogue regarding protection for traditional knowledge, it is 
often asserted that traditional knowledge innovation is 
generated by a group, rather than an individual.250  
Presumably, if the human right is recognized as a collective 
right as well as an individual right, the right to the protection 
of moral and material interests should extend to the group.251  
This is particularly so if one interprets the rights of the 
corporation in accordance with the aggregate theory.252 
In addition, intellectual property law protects group 
interests where the owner is not a natural person. 
Geographical indications can protect collective rights that do 
not necessarily pertain to a natural person.  A geographical 
indication identifies a good as originating in a particular 
region or locality, where a given “quality, reputation or other 
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.”253  In the United States, geographical 
indications are protected as certification marks under the 
Lanham Act.254  A certification mark is used by someone other 
than the owner of the mark and serves to indicate the source 
of the good.255  The right to use a geographical indication may 
be given to a natural or legal person, but the holder of the 
right will often be a governmental or non-governmental 
organization, rather than a natural person.  These rights are 
particularly pertinent to the discussion about a human rights 
framework because geographical indications have been 
proposed as one way to protect traditional knowledge that has 
not otherwise been protected under the current intellectual 
property system.256 
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One could argue that a human right to intellectual 
property protection should pertain to the creator or the 
“author” of the work.257  In patent law for instance, inventors 
are presumed to be natural persons.258  However, it would be 
necessary to address the fact that copyright law, for instance, 
sometimes distinguishes the legal creator and owner of the 
work from the physical creator of the work.  Under the work-
for-hire doctrine, for example, the copyright belongs to the 
person who commissioned the work rather than the artist.259  
The law treats the commissioner of the work, and not the 
artist, as the author.260  Likewise, if the work is made in the 
course of employment, the copyright belongs to the employer 
rather than the employee.261  To the extent that a trademark 
could be considered a literary or artistic production, the 
human right to the material and moral interests could 
encompass trademark as well.  Trademark law, however, 
provides protection to the user of the mark, not necessarily 
the creator of the mark.262 
Of course, a human right to the creative work does not 
have to follow the same path as the legal right.  In such a 
case, a human right to intellectual property might constrain 
the legal owner of the work from taking certain actions with 
regard to the work.  This could create a balancing effect by 
forcing the legal owner to accommodate human rights 
principles.  On the other hand, there may be reasons for a 
human right to intellectual property to follow the legal route 
and treat the person who commissioned the work, whether it 
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is a natural or legal person, as the creator of the work. 
Unlike moral rights, which are arguably pertinent only to 
natural persons, the protection of a proprietary or pecuniary 
interest could reasonably extend to legal persons.  This is 
because property owners, and individuals with some kind of 
proprietary interest, can be legal or natural persons.  The 
language of Article 17 of the UDHR suggests that both 
individuals and groups have a right to own property.  Thus, 
whether one views a corporation as an individual or as a 
collective of human individuals,263 there is some basis for 
corporations to claim property rights under the rubric of 
human rights.  Moreover, the rationale for protecting 
property rights as fundamental rights may be equally 
applicable to natural and legal persons.264  It has been 
suggested that the inclusion of corporate interests under 
European human rights law is due to recognition that the 
ability of governments to arbitrarily deprive any group of 
their possessions would undermine the rule of law.265  Thus, 
the potential for corporations to successfully justify stronger 
intellectual property protections by framing their claims 
using human rights concepts is a relevant consideration to 
the potential impact of a human rights framework for 
intellectual property.266  The tendency for intellectual property 
owners will be to focus on their human right to intellectual 
property protection rather than contemplating ways to limit 
their ownership interests.  Before concluding, this Article 
offers some preliminary thoughts on ways to limit corporate 
claims within the context of a human rights framework. 
 
 263. Applying aggregate theory or the natural entity theory of the 
corporation, respectively. 
 264. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 62 (“In particular, the treaties’ 
drafters understood that the rule of law in general and the stability and 
predictability of property rights in particular would be undermined if 
governments could arbitrarily deprive any class of owners of their possessions, 
although they also recognized that states should have considerable leeway to 
adopt and modify economic and social policies that adversely affect private 
property interests.”). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. (“Claims involving corporate property violations . . . allege that 
human rights law requires more extensive protection of inventions, trademarks, 
and creative works.”). 
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B. Limiting Corporate Claims 
As in the Budweiser case, legal persons may seek to 
protect their intellectual property under human rights law.  
Alternatively, legal persons could adopt human rights 
principles or framing in order to strengthen their intellectual 
property claims.  Rather than discounting the possibility of 
corporate claims, it is worth contemplating how to limit the 
scope of potential corporate claims, if this is indeed the goal. 
One possible approach is to completely disaggregate the 
ownership of the intellectual property from the human rights 
aspects of the intellectual property.  Since there will always 
be a natural person creator, it would be possible to always 
attribute any intellectual-property-related human right back 
to the human creator but not to the owner of the intellectual 
property.  If the human rights aspect of the intellectual 
property always relates back to the creator, rather than the 
owner of the right, then even if there is a strengthened 
intellectual property right, it will remain with the natural 
person.267  For instance, purchasing intellectual property 
protected goods does not amount to a transfer of the 
intellectual property right, or any associated human rights.  
The transfer of the physical good is distinct from the transfer 
of the intellectual property right.  Likewise, the transfer of 
ownership in an intellectual property right could be 
distinguished from the transfer of any associated human 
right. 
Thus, while corporations could own intellectual property 
rights, any associated human right, including the property 
right, could remain with the human creator.  This does not 
alleviate possibility of having a more entrenched right, but it 
is one possible way to limit claims by legal persons.  This is 
also more consistent with the common understanding of 
human rights as being based on the inherent dignity of the 
human person.  The challenge that arises with distinguishing 
between the owner and the creator is that, as discussed 
previously, there may be instances where the work is the 
result of collaboration and the creator is a legal person or a 
 
 267. This could make the transfer of intellectual property rights highly 
complicated.  Since human rights are inalienable, one would expect the human 
right to the intellectual property protection to be non-transferable, despite the 
transferability of the legal right. 
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group of persons rather than a single natural person.  Under 
the aggregate theory of the corporation, it is more difficult to 
argue that we should limit the rights of the corporate entity, 
or any collective of individuals than it would be under the 
concession theory of the corporation. 
Yet, a human right to intellectual property protection 
does not need to follow the path of intellectual property law.  
Work for hire, for example, does not need to have any place in 
the human rights and intellectual property framework.  If 
human rights protection to the moral and material interests 
in creative products takes a route of its own, this distinction 
could be helpful in reducing concerns about potential 
corporate capture of the human rights lens.  Nonetheless, 
there are risks to promoting a human right to intellectual 
property.  Since none of the pertinent human rights 
instruments speaks of intellectual property per se, it is 
possible, and preferable, to refrain from merging these two 
distinct areas of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The implications of a human rights framework depend on 
whether the framework is used to limit intellectual property 
rights or to promote a human right to intellectual property 
protection.  Framing intellectual property rights as human 
rights could alter our perception and treatment of these 
rights.  The effect of characterizing patents, trademarks, and 
copyrights as property rights is indicative of the importance 
of framing.268  In light of the European approach to corporate 
human rights, the global trend towards increased intellectual 
property rights, and the treatment of corporate rights under 
European and American law, it is difficult to discount 
corporations in the dialogue about a human rights 
framework.269  The concept of a human right to intellectual 
property protection may facilitate the ability of intellectual 
property owners, many of whom are transnational 
corporations, to assert that they have fundamental property 
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interests in their patents, copyrights, or trademarks. 
The greatest appeal of the human rights approach and 
the greatest prospect for human rights to have a moderating 
effect on intellectual property law is in the use of human 
rights to limit intellectual property protection where 
intellectual property rules negatively affect human rights 
interests.  The potential downside of adopting a human rights 
approach is most evident with respect to use of the framework 
to promote intellectual property protection.  For this reason, 
an author’s human right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production should be recognized as distinct from the 
existing intellectual property protection.  Human rights law 
can counter intellectual property law where the two come into 
conflict, but these two areas of law should not be merged, 
even if the goal is to promote greater balance. 
 
